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ELECTION LAW AS ELECTIVE OF CHOICE 
KIRSTEN NUSSBAUMER* 
Election Law is no longer a boutique course (if it ever was).1  It is an 
elective, of course.  But it is one that has become increasingly well-suited for 
teaching some of the fundamentals of the law-school curriculum, and not only 
in the classroom, but outside it too, in settings that are more directly oriented to 
practice. 
I.  ELECTION LAW AS FUNDAMENTAL IN THE LAW SCHOOL CLASSROOM 
Modern Election Law as a stand-alone course and a self-consciously 
distinct field of scholarship is still quite young, dating only to the late 
twentieth-century.  According to the self-reports of some of the pioneers in the 
field, Election Law courses (together with related courses that are based on 
somewhat different but overlapping subject-matter divisions such as Political 
Regulation, or Law of Democracy) were spurred in major part by the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s “constitutionalization . . . of representation in the early 
1960s.”2  Consequently, much of the associated scholarship at the turn of the 
century has positioned academic election law as a sort of critical auxiliary 
corps for the Supreme Court as the Justices continue to work out the legacy of 
 
* Stanford University, M.A., J.D., Ph.D., kirsten_n@me.com.  Many thanks to my research 
assistant Mandi Moutray for help with sources. 
 1. Not that I have any beef with the unabashedly boutique courses in the curriculum.  
Electives are elective for a reason. 
 2. Daniel H. Lowenstein, Election Law as a Subject—A Subjective Account, 32 LOY. L.A. 
L. REV. 1199, 1201 (1999) (stating that the key events in the growth of election law as an 
academic field were the Supreme Court’s 1960s cases constitutionalizing representation, the 
Voting Rights Act of 1965, the 1974 amendments to the Federal Election Campaign Act, and 
related state campaign finance regulation); see also Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Not 
by “Election Law” Alone, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1173, 1174 (1999) (stating that “the Warren 
Court began the process of making democracy the focal point of American constitutional law”).  
The first two modern casebooks were published as recently as 1995 and 1998.  DANIEL HAYS 
LOWENSTEIN, ELECTION LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (1995); SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF, PAMELA 
S. KARLAN & RICHARD H. PILDES, THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY: LEGAL STRUCTURE OF THE 
POLITICAL PROCESS (1998); cf. Pamela S. Karlan, Constitutional Law, the Political Process, and 
the Bondage of Discipline, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1185 (1999) (relating the new stand-alone 
treatments of the field to the coverage of political law provided in general constitutional law 
casebooks). 
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the Warren Court’s voting rights cases.3  With U.S. Supreme Court opinions as 
the focus of the field—and the fact that only a small percentage of law school 
graduates have ever been situated to play a role in developing federal judicial 
doctrine about elections—one might then suspect that election law as a start-up 
enterprise was indeed a pretty high-end boutique. 
In fact, however, election law was conceived from the get-go, or at least by 
its “puberty” (as Richard Hasen was dating the field by 1999), in terms both 
pragmatic and sophisticated, with pedagogical purposes and an 
interdisciplinary mindset that might be fundamental for future lawyers whether 
or not they were ever to get near a vote dilution or campaign finance problem 
in practice.4  Even courses that were primarily a form of advanced 
constitutional law could be, and were, designed as an avenue for grappling 
with fundamental questions of democratic theory.5  According to Hasen’s 
summary of a 1999 symposium on election law as a field, the stated 
pedagogical purposes of the course could be as wide-ranging as the enrichment 
of constitutional law, the elucidation of the law of the corporation, and 
encouragement of critical thinking as a means of challenging excessively 
cynical and partisan views about politics.6  Election law was born of two 
“parents, constitutional law and political science.”7  But election law was also, 
at least implicitly, a liberal art, maybe something of a “Civics for Lawyers.” 
To my mind, these eclectic, interdisciplinary features of the subject are not 
only the high points of the field as terrain for scholarship.  They are also the 
features that are most likely to make the Election Law course beneficial for 
students in the long-run (with our students imagined both from the perspective 
of their futures as practitioners and as members of a political community).  
These interdisciplinary nodes are, quite consciously, the emphasis of my own 
courses in Election Law. 
Start with Election Law as a node between law and empirical political 
science.  Realistically, the course cannot provide systematic training in social 
science methods due to the amount of time that is needed for the difficult legal 
materials (for example, the dense Supreme Court opinions on redistricting or 
 
 3. See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, Introduction: Election Law at Puberty: Optimism and 
Words of Caution, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1095, 1100 (1999); Daniel R. Ortiz, From Rights to 
Arrangements, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REV 1217, 1218 (1999). 
 4. Hasen, supra note 3, at 1095, 1097 (pegging the state of the field in 1999 as at “puberty,” 
and observing that “[a]ll of the participants [in the symposium on election law as a field] agree 
about one thing: the study of election law serves important pedagogical purposes”). 
 5. See Karlan & Pildes, supra note 2, at 1185 n.3. 
 6. Hasen, supra note 3, at 1097. 
 7. Id. at 1096. 
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campaign finance).8  The subject-matter of Election Law is, however, ideally 
suited for modest efforts to nudge law students toward a more empirical 
mentality that may help compensate for some of the cognitive limitations that 
can result from single-minded focus on doctrinal argument in the adversary 
context.  This sort of empirical-mindedness is likely to be of use in many areas 
of legal practice, but Election Law is particularly effective at bringing the 
connections between the empirical and the legal to the fore.9  Legal reasoning 
in many election law cases is buttressed by the parties’ introduction of 
empirical social science about the effects of a particular election rule; in other 
cases, the reasoning is haunted by concerns about the lack of empirical 
evidence for either side in the litigation (witness, for example, the unsettled 
questions about the relationships between voter identification laws, voter fraud, 
and burdens on the right to vote).10  Either category of cases (the ones that 
incorporate social science evidence and the ones that seem to turn on 
empirically unsupported premises) can be used in the classroom to encourage 
empiricism. 
Often, when empirical matter first arises in the Election Law classroom, 
law school socialization seems to have made it instinctive for some students to 
approach their assessment of the empirical claim from the sole perspective of 
whether it will provide them another weapon in the rhetorical arsenal for a 
position to which they have already committed.  I try to counterbalance this 
kind of results-oriented thinking by occasionally putting my students in non-
adversarial roles (both in the context of a legislative staff simulation and in 
 
 8. The first time I taught Election Law to law students, I did assign a standard reading load 
of chapters from one of the excellent casebooks while also assigning, for almost every unit, 
relevant social science articles.  This was overkill. 
 9. Empiricism has been a presence in election law for a long time, but it became all the 
more prominent after the 2000 presidential election made fact-intensive “nuts and bolts” 
questions of election administration into a subject of interest for legal scholars and political 
scientists.  See Richard L. Hasen, Introduction: Developments in Election Law, 42 LOY. L.A. L. 
REV. 565, 566–67 (2009) (describing the field’s about-face from the previous decade when fact-
intensive regulatory questions were frequently derided as unfit subjects for Election Law to the 
post-Bush v. Gore world in which election mechanics are a major and respected subject of 
scholarship and teaching).  In 1999, James Gardner put forward a skeptical view of what 
empirical political science has to offer election law, but even then he recognized the phenomenon 
of a growing political-science institutionalism that could serve as a fitting disciplinary partner.  
See James A. Gardner, Stop Me Before I Quantify Again: The Role of Political Science in the 
Study of Election Law, 32 L.A. L. REV. 1141, 1155–56 (1999). 
 10. See, e.g., Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181 (2008); Christopher S. 
Elmendorf, Empirical Legitimacy and Election Law, in RACE, REFORM, AND REGULATION OF 
THE ELECTORAL PROCESS 117 (Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Heather K. Gerken & Michael S. Kang 
eds., 2011); Richard L. Hasen, After the Storm: The Uses, Normative Implications, and 
Unintended Consequences of Voting Reform Research in Post-Bush v. Gore Equal Protection 
Challenges, in RETHINKING THE VOTE: THE POLITICS AND PROSPECT OF AMERICAN ELECTION 
REFORM 185 (Ann N. Crigler, Marion R. Just & Edward J. McCaffery eds., 2004). 
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everyday Socratic questioning about the court cases).  The students are asked 
to imagine they are deliberating with others from their own firm, nonprofit, 
political party, or legislative office about the choice of appropriate means to 
meet broad ends that are already specified by a client or boss.  The limited, but 
not unworthy, pedagogical goals of these exercises are to facilitate students’ 
ability to go where the evidence leads them and to switch gears if the evidence 
takes them to an unexpected place, to have a better sense of when a legal 
question might implicate an empirical question, and to encourage them to have 
the confidence to consult empirical sources as supplements to the strictly legal 
materials. 
Next, consider the interdisciplinary nodes where election law meets 
political theory, the liberal arts, and “civics for lawyers.”  These get as much 
attention in my Election Law courses as does the empirical.  To an extent, this 
is not a matter of choice.  Normative democratic theory, in particular, has been 
such a major import into the field that it is probably a central part of anyone’s 
Election Law course.  Much of the reasoning in the Supreme Court’s 
twentieth-century election law cases can sound in democratic theory as much 
as it does in general constitutional-law doctrines like equal protection or the 
First Amendment.  Yet the reasoning often seems under-theorized as compared 
to other areas of constitutional doctrine.11  A substantial body of commentary 
then brings in insights from academic democratic theory as a primary tool for 
filling in the ellipses.12 
An outsider to the field might then think that Election Law is a second-best 
(or worse) way to teach political theory.  If we are going to talk about 
democratic theory, why go for the often complicated and inelegant court 
opinions rather than just assign Madison, Locke, or Arendt?  I think the answer 
is that, in Election Law, we are engaged in a very special kind of political 
theory that is at the intersection between particular institutional design choices 
and the substance of democracy, that this kind of theory is important (whether 
or not one thinks it should appear quite so prominently in judicial opinions), 
and that it is a way of thinking that plays to the strengths of lawyers.  It is one 
thing to develop a general theory about, say, the value of descriptive 
representation in the legislature.  It is another thing for our students to become 
skilled at recognizing that a very concrete design choice (say, the choice 
 
 11. On Samuel Issacharoff and Richard Pildes’s account, this incomplete, sometimes 
unsatisfying, nature of the reasoning of the cases is not to the Court’s discredit, but is rather the 
result of functional necessity, and “[t]he Warren Court’s need to create a vision of democracy ex 
nihilo from the constitutional order.”  Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 2, at 1174.  “[T]he Warren 
Court began the process of making democracy the focal point of American constitutional law” at 
a time when the “Court had little basis in text, history, or judicial precedent for developing a 
robust conception of democratic politics.” Id. 
 12. See, e.g., Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Constitutional Pluralism and Democratic Politics: 
Reflections on the Interpretive Approach of Baker v. Carr, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1103 (2002). 
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between at-large versus district-based city council elections in the context of 
racially-polarized voting in a community with a particular history) may entail a 
trade-off between descriptive and substantive representation, or (under 
somewhat different conditions) a trade-off between descriptive representation 
and thoroughgoing disempowerment of a minority. 
The first exercise in general theory may be asking our law students to be 
political-theorists-lite.  The second exercise appeals to the skills of a lawyer, 
where we may reasonably think they can develop a comparative advantage 
over the theorists and empiricists.13  Substantive democratic theory is in play, 
but it is a “gas-and-water-works” kind of theory that should require no 
apologies for its grounded character.14  This theory develops an appreciation 
for the substance of institutional design that our graduates may later put to use 
in drafting an instrument on behalf of clients and employers, or in their 
capacity as citizens, including in quite mundane settings such as, say, the 
adoption of decision rules for the local co-op.15 
“Civics for lawyers” then becomes an important component of the exercise 
if we hope that our students will use their advantages in ways other than to 
simply work the angles of facially-neutral rules and institutions—angles that 
might not be equally well-understood by many of their fellow citizens.16  I 
suspect that my Election Law courses may make some of my students more, 
not less, cynical about the choices that we make about electoral rules and 
institutions.  While some of them arrive on the first day of class as 
unmistakable political junkies, others will be learning for the first time just 
how thoroughgoing the partisan calculus can be for each ostensibly technical 
issue.  It does not bother me in the least if these students are becoming more 
cynical along the way for reasons that are justified by the realities on the 
ground—so long as we are also giving them a chance to consider at each 
juncture how we might redesign electoral rules and institutions from the 
 
 13. For at least those of us who also teach Civil Procedure, this focus on our students’ ability 
to recognize, evaluate, and manipulate “the substance of procedure” in its most concrete and 
textual detail will feel quite familiar. 
 14. See PHILIP PETTIT, REPUBLICANISM: A THEORY OF FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENT 239–
40 (1997) (touting a “gas-and-water-works” political theory in which pedestrian questions of 
institutional design are taken seriously, and criticizing mainstream political theory for pursuit of 
ideal theory at the cost of “detachment from institutional analysis”). 
 15. I use the word “citizen” loosely and advisedly to refer to any person acting in a capacity 
of political membership. 
 16. See, e.g., Joshua Fougere, Stephen Ansolabehere & Nathaniel Persily, Partisanship, 
Public Opinion, and Redistricting, in RACE, REFORM, AND REGULATION OF THE ELECTORAL 
PROCESS, supra note 10, at 227, 229–31 (describing the public’s lack of understanding about the 
redistricting process). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
752 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 56:747 
perspectives of political equality, accountable government, or other public-
interest values that are of importance to them.17 
Finally, history might be considered an important interdisciplinary node 
for an Election Law course.  Historical context is most obviously of 
importance for ensuring that students without a strong history background can 
understand something about why race is so central to election law. To this end, 
valuable materials on U.S. histories of enfranchisement and 
disenfranchisement have always been a part of the Election Law canon.18  
Historical (human-centered) narratives are also a useful supplement for those 
students who may otherwise have difficulty grasping the high substantive 
stakes of the arcana of election law.19 
I will admit that, in some respects, the node between history and election 
law strikes me as the weakest interdisciplinary link.  For this reason, I 
supplement some of the assigned readings throughout the course with (very 
short) lectures designed to provide more historical context (not history offered 
as a direct source of normative values, but rather, history oriented towards 
understanding and explanation). 
For example, to an important extent, I think that fuller historical 
understanding may make it difficult to view the Warren Court’s entrance into 
the political thicket as the point at which U.S. democracy became 
constitutionalized (an impression one can easily get from the sometimes 
exclusive scholarly focus on the modern U.S. Supreme Court cases).  To me, 
 
 17. On the defense of education generally as a liberal art or civics, see MARTHA C. 
NUSSBAUM, NOT FOR PROFIT: WHY DEMOCRACY NEEDS THE HUMANITIES (2010).  My thinking 
on the liberal-arts aspect of law school as including a component of training for citizen values is 
influenced by Nussbaum’s work, but obviously liberal arts in the context of professional training 
will have to have a specialized character, requiring us to think about what it might mean for a 
lawyer to be a good citizen. 
 18. See, e.g., Roy A. Schotland, And for the Student? The Seven Striking Strengths of 
“Ballots, Bucks, Maps & the Law”, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1227, 1227–29 (1999) (treating 
Election Law as education in the history of race).  I find the two pioneering casebooks to be very 
useful on this score.  (I cannot yet speak to the other casebooks, but look forward to getting to 
know the forthcoming casebook by Guy Charles and James Gardner, as well as another recent 
arrival, MICHAEL DIMINO, BRADLEY SMITH & MICHAEL SOLIMINE, VOTING RIGHTS AND 
ELECTION LAW (2010)).  Thanks to tips from others, I have shown films about enfranchisement 
politics to my classes.  E.g., Eyes on the Prize: Bridge to Freedom: 1965 (PBS television 
broadcast Feb. 25, 1987) (for the struggle for African-American voting rights); IRON-JAWED 
ANGELS (HBO Films 2004) (for the struggle over women’s suffrage).  In Missouri, I added local 
interest through the teaching of the (St. Louis-litigated) women’s suffrage case of Minor v. 
Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1875). 
 19. An example that I assign is STEVE BICKERSTAFF, LINES IN THE SAND: CONGRESSIONAL 
REDISTRICTING IN TEXAS AND THE DOWNFALL OF TOM DELAY (2007).  For Bush v. Gore and 
election recount mechanics, I have recommended, but not required, viewing of the film RECOUNT 
(HBO Films 2008), and reading of JAY WEINER, THIS IS NOT FLORIDA: HOW AL FRANKEN WON 
THE MINNESOTA SENATE RECOUNT (2010). 
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there was already a significant component of election law that was 
constitutional law, but it was a constitutional tradition (or set of traditions) 
rooted in Congress or in the constitutions, judiciaries, and legislatures of the 
states.20  It was thus inconspicuous in federal-court-centered law schools and 
legal scholarship.  With a broader historical perspective, the question of 
constitutionalization of election law becomes much more cleanly separated 
from the question of (federal) judicialization. 
This point about the potential distortions of an excessive focus on the 
federal case law, however, brings me to the latest trends in election law 
scholarship.  Much of this new scholarship, especially the so-called “new 
institutionalism,” is in fact pushing strongly toward greater emphasis on 
legislatures, administrative agencies, mechanisms of direct democracy, and 
other political actors (whether or not this scholarship makes use of historical 
methodologies).21  The movement is not toward abandoning the study of 
federal courts, but rather toward the study of the full range of institutions that 
might be relevant to election law, with an emphasis on understanding the 
interactions between these different institutions.  In pursuit of these ends, the 
scholarship pushes yet further towards interdisciplinarity.22 
While interdisciplinary scholarship is, at least in casual discourse, 
sometimes viewed as an intellectual luxury good that might not be that 
important for those of our students who are not headed for academia or 
government service, it is, in my opinion, precisely the direction that Election 
Law courses should continue to go in order to be of most use to our students.  
 
 20. A nice example of the historical perspective that I have in mind, that is, historical 
scholarship that engages with aspects of the constitutional tradition of election law in which the 
center of gravity is outside the federal courts, is JOSH CHAFETZ, DEMOCRACY’S PRIVILEGED 
FEW: LEGISLATIVE PRIVILEGE AND DEMOCRATIC NORMS IN THE BRITISH AND AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONS (2007).  On election law in state constitutions, see, for example, James A. 
Gardner, Representation Without Party: Lessons from State Constitutional Attempts to Control 
Gerrymandering, 37 RUTGERS L.J. 881 (2006). 
 21. A good way to see this institutional shift is to survey the essays in a new edited volume, 
RACE, REFORM, AND REGULATION OF THE ELECTORAL PROCESS, supra note 10.  For some of 
these authors, the shift is not merely for descriptive or explanatory purposes, it is also a normative 
shift in thinking about which institutions might best be entrusted with election reform.  See, e.g., 
Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Heather K. Gerken & Michael S. Kang, Introduction: The Future of 
Elections Scholarship, in RACE, REFORM, AND REGULATION OF THE ELECTORAL PROCESS, supra 
note 10, at 1–2 (suggesting that “we may find that courts should play a less central role in 
regulating politics”); Heather K. Gerken & Michael S. Kang, The Institutional Turn in Election 
Law Scholarship, in RACE, REFORM, AND REGULATION OF THE ELECTORAL PROCESS, supra note 
10, at 86, 96 (suggesting that “political science might find a better genetic partner [than 
constitutional law] to sire the second generation of election law scholarship” and further 
suggesting that that partner should be administrative law). 
 22. Again, an easy way to see the shift is to review the scope of the contributions to RACE, 
REFORM, AND REGULATION OF THE ELECTORAL PROCESS, supra note 10. 
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At least if this interdisciplinarity continues to be of the variety that de-
emphasizes the study of federal courts and judicial doctrine in isolation, our 
Election Law will be a field that is better-equipped to teach students skills of 
statutory interpretation.23  And it will be a field that does a better job of 
instilling in our students a more complete sense of their options—that they can 
and should consider judicial, administrative, legislative, and civil-society 
strategies as substitutes or complements on behalf of their clients, and perhaps 
also, on behalf of their own interests as citizens.24 
II.  ELECTION LAW AS FUNDAMENTAL FOR PRACTICE 
In both my Election Law and Legislation courses, I remark in the first class 
that one of my goals for the students is that they become more aware of the 
ways in which a lawyer may put specifically legal skills to use in legislative 
and administrative settings.  Even the future litigators among them should 
cultivate a flexible mindset with which they can recognize circumstances in 
which their client may be better served by a turn to a legislature or agency 
rather than to the courts.  Other students may want to explore truly legislative 
careers in which they use their training in law and the courts for the primary 
purpose of assessing and drafting legislation or agency regulations. 
The first time I offered these comments to my Legislation class (for a 
course at the University of Minnesota that included a significant election law 
component), some of the students descended on my office afterwards to ask for 
more specifics about where they might go to find out about legislative career 
paths.  (Some of them had a strong prior interest in the electoral process, while 
others were apparently motivated by a more general concern about the need to 
expand their options in a potentially difficult job market.)  Their questions led 
me to create an election-law-focused legislative externship with Minnesota’s 
elected Secretary of State, Mark Ritchie (of the Democratic-Farmer-Labor 
Party). 
This externship program was—thanks to the exemplary care of Secretary 
Ritchie and his staff—a very successful experience for the students, and it was 
one that convinced me that election law may be the ideal subject for law-
 
 23. Of course, the field has long had an emphasis on our most important statute, the Voting 
Rights Act (“VRA”).  Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 445 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 
1971, 1973 to 1973bb-1 (2006)).  But the VRA is in many respects a framework statute or 
“common-law statute” for which (of necessity) the federal courts have been especially prominent 
in working out its meaning, and have done so in ways that may not call upon the full range of 
statutory-interpretation skills. 
 24. Cf. Bruce E. Cain, Election Law as a Field: A Political Scientist’s Perspective, 32 LOY. 
L.A. L. REV. 1105, 1119 (1999) (urging that Election Law be re-labeled “Political Regulation” to 
encourage thinking about problems that might be better resolved by pathways other than 
litigation). 
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school training in fundamentals outside the classroom as well as inside it.  The 
students could get excited about the broad (often perhaps too abstract) 
institutional themes of the Election Law and Legislation courses because they 
were witnessing these themes in vivid action, often from the insider 
perspective.25  Of course, only a small percentage of the modest number of 
students who will go on to legislative careers are likely to specialize in election 
law.  Nonetheless, I came away thinking that election law may be a superior 
vantage point for learning about the legislative process generally because it is a 
subject that tunes students into the electoral dynamics and the substance of 
procedure that are characteristic of all legislation. 
The Secretary of State externship (unbeknownst to me at the time) may 
have been part of a larger trend in academia towards practicums in election 
law.  Certainly, many faculty members (including some of us who are so-
called doctrinal faculty as well as clinical faculty) are offering students new 
experiences with election law in action.26  While some of these professors no 
doubt have more experience than I do, I will say a bit about the nuts-and-bolts 
of the Minnesota externship because I happen to be familiar with it and 
because I believe some of its features may be replicable in other states. 
 
 25. For example, the student-externs could learn from Minnesota’s legislative efforts to 
come into compliance with a new federal law, the Military and Overseas Voter Empowerment 
Act (“MOVE”), Pub. L. No. 111-84, § 575, 123 Stat. 2190, 2318 (2009), about (i) the interplay 
between the government branches when administrators are expected to play a role in setting the 
state legislative agenda and shaping the content of state legislation; (ii) the ways in which new 
federal legislation could effectively set the state legislative agenda yet also leave substantial room 
for states to make very different implementation choices; (iii) the interests of state actors and 
intergovernmental lobbies in shaping federal and state legislation; (iv) the diffusion of ideas 
among state and local actors from different states; (v) the importance of local government; and, 
not least, (vi) the mix of public-interest argumentation and factional electoral calculation that 
seems to accompany every election-reform proposal. 
 26. For example, Nathaniel Persily at Columbia Law School has developed a course in 
which his students learn to use redistricting software in order to draw proposed congressional 
district lines.  Columbia Law School Project to Draw Congressional Maps for Redistricting Goes 
Live, COLUM. UNIV., http://www.law.columbia.edu/media_inquiries/news_events/2011/march 
2011/gerrymander-persily (last visited Feb. 18, 2012).  At the Moritz College of Law at Ohio 
State, there is a legislation clinic that is sometimes focused on election-law issues such as 
campaign finance, term limits, and direct democracy.  See Terri L. Enns, Clinical Professor of 
Law, ELECTION L. MORITZ, http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/faculty/enns.php (last visited 
Feb. 18, 2012).  At the College of William and Mary, the Election Law Program (a joint venture 
with the National Center for State Courts) works with a law student group, the Election Law 
Society, on a program in which law students train undergraduates from six schools to serve as 
poll-workers (with funding from a Help America Vote Act grant).  See Election Law Program, 
COLL. WM. & MARY, http://law.wm.edu/academics/intellectuallife/researchcenters/electionlaw/ 
index.php (last visited Feb. 18, 2012); W&M Law Students Receive Federal Grant for Tidewater 
Roots Poll Project, COLL. WM. & MARY (June 29, 2010), http://law.wm.edu/news/stories/2010/ 
wm-law-students-receive-federal-grant-for-tidewater-roots-poll-project.php. 
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The externs were selected out of my general survey course on Legislation 
and thus they began their work with a background in statutory interpretation, 
legislative procedure, and election law.  I also assigned them background 
reading on election administration prior to their official start date with 
Secretary Ritchie.27  The students worked in teams of two in the office of the 
Secretary of State under the supervision of both the Secretary and his legal 
staff.  We also had regular group meetings at the law school (meetings which 
Secretary Ritchie usually joined) in which students presented progress reports 
and all participants offered feedback on the projects as they unfolded.28  The 
students’ primary goal was to create work that might be of short-term use to 
the Office of the Secretary of State, but their own educational interests were 
often at the foreground thanks to the generous supervision they received on 
site.  Students were also required to keep (confidential) journals to reflect upon 
what they were learning. 
The students’ projects were chosen by the Secretary and his staff in 
consultation with University of Minnesota faculty.  Given that the externship 
was only worth two course units (as opposed to the much larger number of 
units that might be earned for a clinic), the projects necessarily emphasized 
policy research over time-intensive legislative drafting.  For example, one 
student team conducted a survey of legislation and bills for implementing the 
federal MOVE Act29 in other states in order to prep Minnesota officials as they 
set about fashioning the state’s own legislation.  The students created a chart 
with side-by-side comparisons of the different approaches, and offered 
recommendations about which policies might work best in Minnesota.  Their 
research was highly interdisciplinary, including the reading of empirical social 
science research and interviews with relevant political science experts.  
Effectively, the students were policy consultants with the lawyerly chops to 
read statutory texts, acting on behalf of a client conceived to be the Office of 
the Secretary of State. 
 
 27. This reading included STEVEN F. HUEFNER, DANIEL P. TOKAJI & EDWARD B. FOLEY, 
FROM REGISTRATION TO RECOUNTS: THE ELECTION ECOSYSTEMS OF FIVE MIDWESTERN 
STATES (2007), and Jocelyn Benson’s scholarship on secretaries of state, JOCELYN F. BENSON, 
STATE SECRETARIES OF STATE (2010). 
 28. Nothing about the externship felt like work to me.  In part, this was because we had on 
board as full faculty partners two other Minnesota faculty (William McGeveran and Carol 
Chomsky, both of whom have expertise in legislative process and statutory interpretation).  
Initially, I sought out participation of other faculty for extrinsic reasons (because I wanted the 
possibility of long-term continuity past my two-year fellowship at Minnesota).  But I would now 
recommend collective faculty supervision on the intrinsic grounds that it gives the group 
meetings more of a law-firm character, and, more speculatively because, for the long-run, it may 
protect against individual political agendas. 
 29. Pub. L. No. 111-84, § 575, 123 Stat. 2190, 2318 (2009). 
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Obviously, it was vital that the students’ projects be carefully crafted to 
avoid any reality or appearance of a partisan cast (a problem that might not be 
a concern in a practicum that works with a non-elected government office or 
even in many elected offices that deal with non-electoral matters).  In choosing 
the student projects, the goal was to create an experience in which a Federalist 
Society member could be as comfortable as a member of the American 
Constitution Society, a Democrat as much as a Republican.  This was a success 
(something that might not be as easy to pull off in a state where there is less of 
a ‘good-government’ civil-service tradition than there is in Minnesota).30 
The only downside of working with an elected official on election law (of 
which I am aware) is that neither the university nor the Office of the Secretary 
of State could be certain much in advance of the semester’s start whether the 
externship could actually take place since it was contingent on either the 
Secretary winning re-election or a new Secretary wanting to continue with the 
program.  For other faculty who may be considering such a program in other 
places, it might be possible to institutionalize their university’s relationship to 
the Office of the Secretary of State through legislation that would not be tied to 
a specific official.  However, given the importance of working with individuals 
who are especially motivated and competent, it might be better to create 
continuity for an election law externship or practicum by conceiving of the law 
school course as a more general consulting group that is available for different 
organizational clients in different years (with nonprofit as well as 
governmental clients). 
What if this taste of election law in action leads more students to want 
careers that may be hard to come by?  Some law school administrators might 
(depending on their particular state environment) want to look into 
collaborating with their state legislature to create or augment civil-service 
positions for lawyers in election administration or legislative drafting 
generally.31  Nobody could call that boutique. 
 
 30. Even in Minnesota, it was not clear in advance of the externship how easy it would be to 
avoid any suspicion of bias.  Minnesota had already had ample controversy about the contested 
senatorial election between Al Franken and Norm Coleman.  Secretary Ritchie had spoken to my 
Legislation class as a whole about his role in the Franken-Coleman recount.  As one would 
expect, there were students who had divergent views about the election and the role of 
partisanship in its resolution.  But, as it turned out, the Secretary and his staff were so 
professional and intently focused on the externs’ learning that any partisan fears were apparently 
put to rest. 
 31. Cf. Bruce E. Cain, More or Less: Searching for Regulatory Balance, in RACE, REFORM, 
AND REGULATION OF THE ELECTORAL PROCESS, supra note 10, at 263, 278 (proposing that the 
federal government create public lobbyists along the model of public defenders or take steps to 
bolster the nonpartisan standing and professionalism of congressional staff); Congress Needs a 
Clerkship Program, CONG. CLERKSHIP INITIATIVE, www.congressionalclerkship.com (last 
visited Feb. 18, 2012) (describing a proposal by the Dean of Stanford Law School and others to 
create congressional clerkships modeled on federal judicial clerkships). 
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